I Want to Want to Write This Post

Frankfurt’s discussion of both free will and the definition of “person” relies on a tiered system of desires. At the most basic level are first-order desires, which are desires to do something. These can be effective desires, meaning that the desired action is carried out, or ineffective, meaning that is is not. For instance, my first-order desire to have lunch after I finish this post will likely prove effective, but my first-order desire to visit the Moon will probably remain ineffective for quite some time. This leads to Frankfurt’s concept of the will, which he defines as the first-order desire or desires that are motivating a being’s action at a particular time. Essentially, the will is all of the being’s currently effective first-order desires. The will is important, but even more vital to the questions Frankfurt considers are second-order desires. A second-order desire is the desire to have a first-order desire. Typically, the being with the second-order desire wants to want to do something so that they will actually do it, such as when I want to want to write this blog post because I want it to in fact be written. This is a particular kind of second-order desire called a second-order volition. However, it is not the only type. I do not want to vote for Donald Trump in the upcoming presidential election, but I might want to want to vote for him so that I can better understand the psychology of those who honestly do wish to vote for him. This unusual kind of second-order desire is not particularly important to Frankfurt’s arguments, but it is interesting to consider.

Based on these categories of desires, Frankfurt makes two related points. First, he proposes that the concept of a person be defined primarily as “the concept of a type of entity that has both first-order desires and volitions of the second order.” Second-order volitions, he believes, are the essential quality which separates people from other being which he calls “wantons,” those who do not care which of their first-order desires win out and end up motivating action. Second, he introduces a new concept of “freedom of the will.” A person has this freedom, he argues, when their second-order volitions successfully determine which of their first-order desires become effective and thus translate into their will. A drug addict then might lack freedom of the will, because despite having a second-order volition to not want to take their drug, their first-order desire to take it wins out and becomes their will. Frankfurt’s concept of free will attempts to sidestep questions of determinism, because the source of second-order volitions is irrelevant to whether a person possesses freedom of the will be his definition.

Frankfurt’s concept of freedom of the will is certainly a valuable idea, with a variety of ethical and philosophical uses, but it is quite different from the common meaning of “free will.” It thus seems rather disingenuous for him to attempt to pass it off as a replacement. His “freedom of the will” is an important concept, but its existence does nothing to resolve the question of whether humans make meaningful decisions or have our behavior determined by laws of cause and effect. Personally, I am partially free under Frankfurt’s definition. Sometimes my second-order volitions determine my will, but on other occasions my self-discipline fails and I am motivated by opposing first-order desires. However, this is an entirely separate question from whether I have free will in the traditional sense.

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