The Obviousness of the Meaninglessness of Determinism

In order to convince his audience that human behavior is determined, Hume essentially argues that we already act as if it is, making everyday decisions that would be ridiculous if human behavior was not governed by causal determinism. Human behavior, he points out, is widely recognized to be broadly similar even across centuries and continents. People tend to have similar motivations and desires and decision-making processes. The idea of a human society in which everyone acts radically different from these norms is just as unbelievable as a tale of a society consisting entirely of centaurs and pegasi. We accept that the natural world is governed by rigid laws of cause and effect which preclude such fantastical creatures, so why should we not apply the same principle to human behavior and recognize that each action a person takes is the logical result of a variety of causes. Some might point to examples of unusual, irrational behavior with no discernible cause, but Hume replies that
“the internal principles and motives may operate in a uniform manner, notwithstanding these seeming irregularities; in the same manner as the winds, rain, clouds, and other variations of the weather are supposed to be governed by steady principles; though not easily discoverable by human sagacity and enquiry.” In other words, the fact that we cannot always understand the specific causes of a particular rainstorm does not mean we should throw up our hands and conclude that weather is uniquely free from the laws of cause and effect. Rather, we should recognize that we simply do not understand those laws well enough to perfectly understand their operation in every instance. In the same way, human behavior is governed by complex rules which are difficult or perhaps even impossible to fully grasp.

When exploring the implications of the determinism that Hume argues for, I think it is useful to separately examine two possible cases. In one scenario, Hume is right. Human behavior is entirely determined, and thus we do not really make meaningful decisions. All of our actions have discoverable causes. In this case, we cannot choose how we respond to determinism. Our reaction to the idea, how we change our interactions with others because of it, whether they believe it, whether we try to convince them of our position or not, all of these decisions have already been made by the laws of cause and effect. In the other scenario, we are able to make decisions. We can choose whether we believe in determinism or free will, and we can choose how we use this information in our interactions with others. In this case, we should clearly believe the truth of free will and act accordingly, holding ourselves and others as responsible for their actions. Given these two possibilities, it seems to me that there is no reason not to act as though we have free will. If free will exists, then we have made the correct choice. If it does not, there was never a choice to begin with.